











Manuscript version: Author’s Accepted Manuscript 
The version presented in WRAP is the author’s accepted manuscript and may differ from the 
published version or Version of Record. 
 
Persistent WRAP URL: 
http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/153498                            
 
How to cite: 
The repository item page linked to above, will contain details on accessing citation guidance 
from the publisher. 
 
Copyright and reuse: 
The Warwick Research Archive Portal (WRAP) makes this work of researchers of the 
University of Warwick available open access under the following conditions. 
 
This article is made available under the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International 
license (CC BY 4.0) and may be reused according to the conditions of the license.  For more 





Please refer to the repository item page, publisher’s statement section, for further 
information. 
 




When face masks signal social identity: Explaining the deep face-mask divide during 
the COVID-19 pandemic 
 
 
Nattavudh Powdthavee1¶*, Yohanes E. Riyanto2¶, Erwin C.L. Wong2¶, Jonathan X.W. Yeo2¶, 
Qi Yu Chan2¶ 
 
1 Warwick Business School, Scarman Road, Coventry, United Kingdom, CV4 7AL  
2 Nanyang Technological University, SHHK 05-56E, 48 Nanyang Drive, Singapore, 639818 
 
 
¶All authors contributed equally to the research. N.P., Y.E.R., E.C.L.W., J.X.W.Y., and Q.Y.C. 
designed research, performed research, analyzed data, and wrote the paper. The authors declare 
no competing interests. 
 
* Corresponding Author.  








With the COVID-19 pandemic still raging and the vaccination program still rolling out, there 
continues to be an immediate need for public health officials to better understand the 
mechanisms behind the deep and perpetual divide over face masks in America. Using a random 
sample of Americans (N=615), following a pre-registered experimental design and analysis 
plan, we first demonstrated that mask wearers were not innately more cooperative as 
individuals than non-mask wearers in the Prisoners’ Dilemma (PD) game when information 
about their own and the other person’s mask usage was not salient. However, we found strong 
evidence of in-group favouritism among both mask and non-mask wearers when information 
about the other partner’s mask usage was known. Non-mask wearers were 23 percentage points 
less likely to cooperate than mask wearers when facing a mask-wearing partner, and 26 
percentage points more likely to cooperate than mask wearers when facing a non-mask-wearing 
partner. Our analysis suggests social identity effects as the primary reason behind people’s 
decision whether to wear face masks during the pandemic.  
 
 








On 11 March 2020, the World Health Organization (WHO) declared COVID-19 a global 
pandemic, which signifies that the virus had spread worldwide. In response to the WHO’s 
announcement, many governments worldwide started recommending or mandating their 
citizens to work from home, maintain social distance, wash hands regularly, and wear face 
masks or face-covering in public places (1). Yet, despite the latest scientific evidence 
concluding that mass masking is one of the most effective public health strategies to curtail the 
COVID-19 transmission in the community (2-5), a significant number of people in the U.S. 
have, regrettably, continued to reject explicit rules about wearing face masks (6, 7). For 
example, YouGov reported in January 2021 that around 25% of Americans continued to refuse 
to wear face masks in public places (8).  
 
Why do many individuals continue to disregard public health regulations designed to protect 
themselves and others in the community? One hypothesis is that people with different moral 
concerns react differently to the recommended guidelines. In an online study of Americans, 
Chan (9) shows that people who have strong preferences for caring for others and equality for 
all are more likely to adhere to the COVID-19 recommended guidelines, including wearing 
face masks in public places. Another hypothesis is that mask-wearing in America became so 
politicized early on in the pandemic due to the government officials’ inconsistent face mask 
policies, which caused a divide in people’s attitudes towards face masks along the political line 
(10, 11). For instance, Yeung et al. (12) show using Twitter data that there was a sharp and 
persistent increase in polarization between Democrats’ and Republicans’ sentiment towards 
mask-wearing that took place on 3 April 2020 when the Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention (CDC) reversed its earlier stance in favour of personal face mask usage. Rothgerber 
et al. (13) demonstrate that political conservatism is one of the most significant predictors of 
non-compliance with the face mask rules in the U.S. Furthermore, a nationally representative 
study conducted in April-May 2020 shows that Democrats were significantly more likely to 
perceive more risk associated with COVID-19 and, therefore, were more willing to engage in 
protective behaviours, including wearing face masks, than Republicans (14).  
 
Social perception towards people who wear face masks may also determine the face mask 
usage rate in society. Does wearing a face mask signal to other people how much we care about 
protecting ourselves and the community we live in from COVID-19? Or does it signal our 
political identity (15)? By understanding what social cues either wearing or not wearing a face 
mask sends to other people, policymakers can potentially design more effective public 
messages to increase compliance among non-mask wearers. For example, assume that people 
generally perceive mask wearers as individuals who have strong preferences for caring for 
others and non-mask wearers as selfish individuals. Assume also that people cooperate more 
with those who are cooperative, then providing evidence in support of these two assumptions 
to non-mask wearers might give them additional incentives to start wearing face masks. By 
contrast, if wearing face masks signals primarily one’s political identity to others, then 
disloyalty aversion (16, 17) and in-group altruism (18) imply that it would be psychologically 
challenging for non-mask wearers to start cooperating and complying with the official guidance 
as doing so would signal that they are not as loyal to their identity as they believe they are. In 
this case, public messages that emphasize how wearing face masks show caring are unlikely to 
change non-mask wearers’ behaviours. Here, a better appeal might be one that depoliticizes 




In this high-powered, pre-registered study (OSF: https://osf.io/wq47e), we contribute to the 
growing literature that uses social dilemma games to model people’s behaviours in a pandemic 
situation (19-21) that includes, for example, individuals’ strategic decision to take up a vaccine 
(22), and policy makers’ decision of whether to continue shutting down the economy to curtail 
the spread of COVID-19 (23). We do so by experimentally investigating the social perception 
of mask and non-mask wearers during the COVID-19 pandemic in America. Instead of simply 
asking what mask and non-mask wearers think of each other, we look at how information about 
others’ mask-wearing behaviours influences cooperation when real money is at stake. Our 
experimental design, which we describe in detail in the next section, uses a series of 
simultaneous and sequential Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) games as a setting to test the extent to 
which people perceive others’ mask-wearing behaviour as a signal of their willingness to 
cooperate or their political identity. We believe our results could help inform policy makers of 
the motivations behind individuals’ decision to shun face masks and, subsequently, help them 
design the most appropriate public health strategy to encourage non-mask wearers to start 
wearing face masks to protect themselves and others in the community. 
 
Materials and Methods 
Participants 
 
Subjects from the US were recruited via Prolific, to participate in a study about social 
preferences. Given the politicization of face mask usage, we chose to recruit an even 
distribution of subjects from different political affiliations. In total, 615 participants completed 
the study between 9th and 14th December 2020.  
 
Of the 615 participants, 59 (10%) were non-mask wearers, 318 (52%) were males, 214 (35%) 
were Democrats, and 215 (35%) were Republicans. See Table S1 in the Supporting Information 
(SI) appendix for more summary statistics. The relatively small number of non-mask wearers 
in our sample (N=59) is fairly representative of the ~80% face mask usage rate in America 
recorded in December 2020 (24), which was the same period as when we ran our study.. Had 
we run our study in early 2020, we would have been able to recruit a significantly higher 
number of non-mask wearers for our analysis.  
Experimental Details 
Our experiment consisted of two main stages where participants played a series of incentivized 
Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) games — with and without — knowing their partners’ mask usage, 
see Fig 1, Panel 2. In every PD game, participants were shown the PD payoff table in Fig 1, 
Panel 1 and had to choose whether to cooperate (A) or to defect (B) against an opponent. We 
selected the PD game as it represents the standard analytical tool for studying cooperative 
behaviours in a social dilemma setting (25, 26). As defection is a dominant strategy, theory 
predicts that mutual defection would prevail. Willingness to refrain from defecting by 







Fig 1. Experimental setting for the prisoner dilemma (PD) games. Panel 1 depicts the actions and associated 
payoffs for players in the incentivized PD game. Action A represents the choice to cooperate, while action B 
represents the choice to defect. The player’s payoff lies leftwards of the comma in each cell, while the other 
person’s payoff lies rightwards. Participants played the PDs either simultaneously or sequentially. Panel 2 
illustrates Stages 1 and 2 of the PD games. In Stage 1, participants played a series of three PDs without mask 
wearing being salient. In the first PD game, participants choose their actions simultaneously, and in the second 
and the third PD game, they choose their actions conditional on their partners having chosen A or B, respectively. 
In Stage 2, participants played a series of three PDs after mask-wearing was made salient to them. In these three 
PD games, participants choose their actions simultaneously against i) an anonymous partner, ii) a mask-wearer 
partner, and iii) a non-mask-wearer partner. The three PD games were randomly ordered.  
 
 
In the first stage, participants played a series of three PDs. In the first PD, participants and their 
partners simultaneously chose their actions. However, the second and third PDs were 
sequential - that is, subjects chose their actions conditional on their partners choosing either A 
or B, respectively. Here, no one had any information about whether partners were mask 
wearers; neither was mask wearing salient to them. 
 
After the first stage ended and before the second stage began, participants were asked about 
their mask wearing decisions given a fixed hypothetical scenario involving COVID-19. Each 
subject’s answer to the question posed in the scenario was used to classify them as a mask 
wearer (MW) or a non-mask wearer (NMW). 
 
In the second stage, participants played another series of three PDs in a random order against 
i) an anonymous partner, ii) a MW partner, and iii) a NMW partner. In all three PDs, actions 
were chosen simultaneously. In contrast to the first stage, participants playing the PDs in the 
second stage either had direct information about whether partners were mask wearers (i and 
ii); or had mask wearing made salient to them (iii).  
 
At the end of the experiment, we also elicited participants’ altruism towards mask wearers and 
non-mask wearers, and beliefs about mask wearers’ and non-mask wearers’ willingness to 
cooperate in an incentivized manner. We then asked participants to report standard socio-
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demographic questions, and their general attitudes towards mask-wearing in general. For more 
details about the experiment, refer to the Experimental Details in the SI. 
 
General Experimental Procedure 
This research was reviewed and given full approval by the University of Warwick Research 
Governance and Ethics Committee and also the Nanyang Technological University (NTU) 
Institutional Review Board (IRB). All authors confirm that the experiment was performed in 
accordance with the University of Warwick Research Governance and Ethics Committee’s and 
the NTU IRB’s guidelines and regulations. 
The experiment was pre-registered on Open Science Framework: https://osf.io/wq47e. It was 
programmed in oTree (27) and hosted online via a web application using Heroku, a cloud 
application platform (https://www.heroku.com/). The web application was deployed to the 
American public via the Prolific website (www.prolific.co).  
After obtaining participants’ consent to take part in the study, participants were directed to the 
instructions of the experiment, after which they began the PD games. Participants were given 
detailed instructions on all tasks prior to starting each section. We avoided framing whenever 
possible by using neutral terms such as ‘participants’, ‘task’, and ‘other participant you are 
paired with’ instead of words like ‘players’, ‘game’, and ‘partner’.  
The sessions, which comprised a total of 615 participants, were run in four waves from 9 
December 2020 to 14 December 2020 between 11am and 2pm (GMT-5) to account for the 
different time-zones in the U.S. The median completion time of the experiment was 
approximately 18 minutes. Participants were told that they would be paid a show up fee and a 
monetary bonus based on the Experimental Currency Unit (ECU) they had accumulated 
throughout the study. The first 182 participants in the earlier sessions had a show-up fee of $3 
and an exchange rate of 10 ECU per dollar. The other 433 participants in the later sessions had 
a show-up fee of $2.35 and an exchange rate of 5.5 ECU per dollar. The median payment of 
all participants was $4.42, while the median payment of the 433 participants was $4.20. 
Hypotheses 
 
We set out to test the following hypotheses: 
 
H1: Mask wearers are more willing to cooperate than non-mask wearers in the PD 
games when information about each other’s mask usage is not revealed.  
 
Based on the findings that people who have strong preferences for caring for others and equality 
for all are more likely to adhere to the COVID-19 guidelines (9), H1 predicts that face mask 
wearers are more likely to cooperate in the PD games than non-mask wearers when the 
information about the other player’s mask usage is not made publicly available.  
 
H2: Revealed information about other player’s face mask usage signals their willingness 
to cooperate in the PD games. Consequently, mask wearers are more likely to cooperate 
with other mask wearers but defect against non-mask wearers, while non-mask wearers 




Assuming that others perceive mask wearers to be generally more cooperative than non-mask 
wearers (9) and that people are generally conditional cooperators (28), H2 predicts that 
participants are likely to use the revealed information about other people’s mask usage as a 
signal of willingness to cooperate in the PD games. Given that mask wearers expect other mask 
wearers to cooperate, H2 implies that mask wearers will likely cooperate when playing against 
each other and defect when playing against other non-mask wearers who are expected to defect. 
On the other hand, H2 predicts that non-mask wearers will likely defect when playing against 
both mask and non-mask wearers. This is because non-mask wearers will expect (i) mask 
wearers to defect when playing against non-mask wearers and (ii) other non-mask wearers to 
defect in general. Hence, if H2 is true, then the best response for non-mask wearers will be to 
defect when playing against either mask or non-mask wearers.   
     
H3: Revealed information about other player’s face mask usage signals their social 
identity. Consequently, mask wearers are more likely to cooperate with other mask 
wearers but defect against non-mask wearers, while non-mask wearers are more likely 
to defect against mask wearers but cooperate with other non-mask wearers.   
 
According to social identity theory (29), in which an individual’s self-concept is derived from 
membership in a relevant social group, H3 predicts that because of the effect of social identity 
on social preferences and beliefs (30), mask wearers will be more likely to cooperate when 
playing against another mask wearer (in-group) and defect when playing against a non-mask 
wearer (out-group). On the other hand, non-mask wearers will be more likely to cooperate 
when playing against another non-mask wearer (in-group) and defect when playing against a 
mask wearer (out-group). 
 
Table 1. Predictions of mask and non-mask wearers’ cooperative behaviours when 






Playing against a 
mask wearer 
Playing against a 
non-mask wearer 
Mask wearer H2: + H3: + 
H2: - 
H3: - 




Table 1. Predictions of mask and non-mask wearers’ cooperative behaviours. H2 assumes that face masks 
signal cooperation, while H3 assumes that face masks signal social identity. The sign ‘+’ indicates that the average 
cooperation level is higher and ‘-’ is lower than the baseline, where information about the other person’s face 
mask usage is not revealed.  
 
As shown in Table 1, the only difference between H2’s and H3’s predictions can be found in 
the bottom right-hand corner. Here, evidence of non-mask wearers choosing to defect against 
another non-mask wearer would support the hypothesis that face masks signal cooperation and 
compliance to others. On the other hand, evidence of non-mask wearers choosing to cooperate 
more with another non-mask wearer would support the hypothesis that face masks signal social 
identity to others.  
 
Note that there is a possibility that face masks signal both cooperation and social identity, in 
which case the opposing effects may cancel each other out, and non-mask wearers’ cooperation 
level will be similar regardless of whether they are playing against another non-mask wearer 
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or a mask wearer. However, we should continue to observe mask wearers cooperating more 




Previous evidence suggests that people who have strong pro-social preferences are more likely 
to wear face masks in public places (9). Yet, there is little evidence in the first stage of our 
experiment— before we elicited their face mask usage — that mask wearers were more 
prosocial than non-mask wearers when they were playing the PD games against an anonymous 
partner. As can be seen in Fig 2, mask wearers and non-mask wearers did not exhibit 
statistically significant differences in cooperation with anonymous partners.   
 
 
Fig 2. Average cooperation levels in PD games before mask usage elicitation. 4-standard-error bars 
(2 above, 2 below) to represent 95% confidence intervals. 
 
 
Fig 2, Panel 1 shows that when playing the PD game simultaneously, non-mask users 
cooperated 69% of the time compared to 71% of the time for mask wearers (Fisher’s exact test, 
p=0.881). Fig 2, Panels 2 and 3 also show that when playing the PD game sequentially, both 
mask and non-mask wearers cooperated more following a partner’s decision to cooperate (66% 
and 75% respectively) than when following a partner’s decision not to cooperate (22% for 
both). In both cases, the differences across mask and non-mask wearers were not statistically 
significant (Fisher’s exact test, p=0.194 for the former and p=1.000 for the latter). Hence, there 
is little evidence to support H1 that mask wearers are intrinsically more cooperative than non-






Fig 3. Average cooperation levels in PD games after mask usage elicitation. 4-standard-error bars 
(2 above, 2 below) to represent 95% confidence intervals. 
 
We then proceeded by asking participants about their face-mask usage in the second stage of 
the experiment. Following this elicitation, participants played three simultaneous PD games 
against i) an anonymous partner, ii) mask-wearing partner, and iii) non-mask wearing partner 
in random order. Next, we compare the level of cooperation that someone shows towards an 
anonymous partner before and after eliciting information about face mask usage; see Panel 1 
of Figs 2 and 3, respectively. Fig 3, Panel 1 shows 69% of mask wearers and 66% of non-mask 
wearers cooperated when playing against an anonymous partner. Differences in cooperation 
before and after asking about face mask usage were not significant for both mask and non-
mask wearers (Wilcoxon signed-rank test, p=0.307, and p=0.804 for mask and non-mask 
wearers). Neither were the differences between the mask and non-mask wearers in the second 
stage (Fisher’s exact test, p=0.662).  
 
The elicitation of participants’ mask usage after the first stage, which would have made their 
own mask-wearing behaviour salient, did not affect cooperation in the PD game. This result 
suggests that participants do not generally hold stereotypical views about how mask or non-
mask wearers should behave in a social dilemma situation, which is inconsistent with H2. 
While mask and non-mask wearers were equally likely to cooperate when information on 
mask-usage was not revealed, we found significant between-group differences in cooperation 
when partner’s mask-usage was revealed to the participants; see Panels 2 and 3 in Fig 3. When 
playing against another mask wearer, 76% of mask wearers, as opposed to 53% of non-mask 
wearers, cooperated. In contrast, when playing against another non-mask wearer, 44% of mask 
wearers, as opposed to 69% of non-mask wearers, cooperated in the PD game.  
 
These aggregate numbers are more consistent with H3 than H2 in that participants generally 
viewed face masks as a signal of one’s social identity, which could have generated the “us vs. 
them” feelings between in-group and out-group members. Here, we have raw data evidence to 
suggest that mask wearers treated other mask wearers as in-group members and non-mask 
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wearers as out-group members, and vice versa for how non-mask wearers treated other non-
mask wearers and mask wearers in the PD game.  
 
Fig 3’s results continue to be robust even after controlling for gender, age, ethnicity, the 
political party supported, education, household income, the exchange rate, and the order of the 
PD games in a pooled probit regression, see Table S2 in the SI. Holding other things constant, 
we found that non-mask wearers were 2 percentage points less likely to cooperate compared to 
mask wearers when facing an anonymous partner, although the difference was statistically 
insignificantly different from zero (p=0.724). By contrast, non-mask wearers were 23 
percentage points (p=0.001) less likely to cooperate than mask wearers when facing a mask-
wearing partner, and 26 percentage points (p<0.001) more likely to cooperate than mask 
wearers when facing a non-mask wearing partner. 
 
Not only did we find substantial differences in mask and non-mask wearers’ cooperation rates 
within mask and non-mask wearing partner conditions, but we also uncovered evidence of a 
significant variation in mask wearer and non-mask wearers’ cooperation rates across different 
conditions. More specifically, compared to facing an anonymous partner, we found mask 
wearers’ cooperation rates were 7 percentage points (p<0.001) higher when facing a mask-
wearing partner and 25 percentage points (p<0.001) lower when facing a non-mask-wearing 
partner. The difference of 32 percentage points is statistically significant in a t-test, p<0.001. 
In contrast, we found that non-mask wearers’ cooperation rates were 14 percentage points 
(p=0.063) lower when facing a mask-wearing partner and 3 percentage points (p=0.634) higher 
when facing a non-mask-wearing partner, compared to facing an anonymous partner. The 
difference of 17 percentage points is significant in a t-test, p=0.033. Taken together, we have 
enough evidence from the raw data and multivariate analysis to support the hypothesis that 
face masks strongly signal social identity and that individuals are more likely to cooperate with 
in-group members and defect against out-group members.  
 
Incentivized questions at the end of the experiment lend further support to H3, which is based 
on the hypothesis that people of the same identity groups are likely to favour members of one’s 
in-group over out-group members. More specifically, we found that mask wearers (non-mask 
wearers) were 1) more altruistic towards mask wearers (non-mask wearers), 2) more likely to 
believe that other mask wearers (non-mask wearers) would cooperate with them, and 3) more 
likely to believe that other mask wearers (non-mask wearers) expect more cooperation from 
them in the PD game, see Fig S1 in the SI.   We also show that these elicited expectations about 
the mask and non-mask wearers’ willingness to cooperate and their altruism towards them are 
strongly correlated with participants’ cooperation; see Table S3 in the SI. 
 
To what extent can we attribute Fig 3’s evidence of social identity effects from mask usage to 
the evidence of political polarization of face masks in America (10-14)? Looking at the raw 
data, we can see evidence of significant disparity in mask usage by political affiliation in our 
sample; 98% of Democrats identified themselves as mask wearers compared to 88% of 
Independents and 84% of Republicans. These differences are not only sizable but also 
statistically significant; we can reject the null hypothesis that the average mask usage is the 
same across all three political affiliations; Fisher’s exact tests between Democrats-
Independents and Democrats-Republicans produce p-values<0.001. We also uncovered 
evidence that participants supporting different political parties had very different world views. 
In the post-experiment survey, we found Democrats were more likely to report greater concern 
for the Covid-19 situation, and that mask-wearing was a “public health responsibility, the “right 
thing to do”, and an effective anti-COVID19 measure compared to Independents or 
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Republicans. Interestingly, Democrats had more favourable opinions of mask wearers’ morals 
over non-mask wearers’ morals than Independents or Republicans; see Tables S4-S6 in the SI 
for more details. These aggregate numbers lead us to form an additional hypothesis about the 
sources of social identity effects as follows: 
 
H4: Social identity derived from face mask usage can be primarily attributed to one’s 
political affiliation  
 
H4 rests on the assumption that people are aware that there is a higher proportion of mask 
wearers who are Democrats than non-Democrats and, through representativeness heuristic 
(31), perceive that wearing a mask is more representative among Democrats and not wearing 
a mask is more representative among non-Democrats, i.e., face mask usage is a signal of 
political identity.  
 
 
Fig 4. Bias towards mask wearers (MW) over non-mask wearers (NMW) by political affiliation. 
Bias is calculated as the difference in average cooperation levels toward mask wearers (MW) and non-
mask wearers (NMW) in the simultaneous PD games. 4-standard-error bars (2 above, 2 below) to 
represent 95% confidence intervals. 
 
Fig 4 provides raw data analysis of H4 by examining how the bias towards mask wearers over 
non-mask wearers differs across the political spectrum. It shows that bias towards mask 
wearers over non-mask wearers was highest among Democrats, followed by Independents, and 
then Republicans; see Fig 4, Panel 1. Likewise, the bias towards mask wearers over non-mask 
wearers decreases with how conservative participants think of themselves, see Fig 4, Panel 2.  
 
To formally test H4, we included interaction terms between an individual’s political affiliation 
and partner’s mask usage in the fully-specified probit regression where cooperation is the 
outcome variable, see Table S7, Panel A. When facing a mask-wearing partner, Independents’ 
and Republicans’ cooperation rates were 5 percentage points (p=0.334) and 10 percentage 
points (p=0.015) lower than Democrats’. When facing a non-mask-wearing partner, 
Independents’ and Republicans’ cooperation rates were instead both 8 percentage points 
(p=0.151 and p=0.109 respectively) higher than Democrats’. The lower cooperation rates 
towards mask wearers compared to non-mask wearers of 13 percentage points for Independents 
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and 18 percentage points for Republicans are statistically significant in t-tests, p=0.058, and 
p=0.002. Similar results also hold for the interaction between a mask-wearing partner and 
political conservativeness, see Table S7, Panel B. 
 
Moreover, we also found a similar interaction effect of political affiliation and partner’s mask 
usage on participant’s social preferences and beliefs. Compared to Republicans or 
Independents, Democrats were more altruistic (less altruistic) towards other mask wearers 
(non-mask wearers). Furthermore, in almost all comparisons to Republicans or Independents, 
Democrats believed that other mask wearers (non-mask wearers) were more likely (less likely) 
to cooperate with them and to expect more cooperation (less cooperation) from them than non-
mask wearers (mask wearers) in the PD game; see Table S8 in the SI. Regressions that examine 
the interaction between political conservativeness also yield qualitatively similar results; see 
Table S9 in the SI. 
 
What happens to the interaction effects between own and partner’s face mask usage on 
cooperation once we take into account the interplay (interaction) between political affiliation 
and partner’s mask usage? If H4 is true, then including this interplay should drive the 
interaction effects between own and partner’s face mask usage on cooperation towards zero. 
While including the new interaction terms reduced the size of the interaction effects between 
own and partner’s mask usage on cooperation, the effects continued to be quantitatively 
important as well as statistically significant; see Table S10 in the SI. For example, non-mask 
wearers were still 21 percentage points (p=0.002) less likely to cooperate than mask wearers 
when facing a mask-wearing partner, and 25 percentage points (p<0.001) more likely to 
cooperate than mask wearers when facing a non-mask wearing partner even after taking into 
account the interaction terms between political affiliation and partner’s mask usage in the 
regression. 
 
In summary, while there is evidence that political identity drives some of our earlier results of 
social identity effects associated with face mask usage, we cannot attribute the entire effects to 
the hypothesis that face masks are a pure signal of political identity. There is still a residual 
effect that cannot be accounted for by the political identity, which implies that face masks also 
carry an identity, one that is distinct from political identity, that is capable of imparting a sense 
of unity among mask wearers.  
 
This subtle notion of identity could be explained using the insights from the literature on 
minimal groups (32) where the mere identification of individuals to groups — even if on an 
arbitrary basis — suffices to induce “us-vs.-them” effects. It is plausible that strong perceived 
political identity may have served to amplify such minimal group effects in our experiment. 
This might be related to the considerably larger bias towards in-group members over out-group 
members in our experiment of 31 percentage points, compared to the typical social identity 
effects of around 14-19 percentage points found in previous studies (18, 33). An alternative 
explanation of the residual effect might be that mask-wearers (non-mask wearers) have a strong 
distaste against exhibiting anti-social (pro-social) behaviours. Consequently, mask-wearers 
(non-mask wearers) might want to engage in pro-social (anti-social) punishment against non-









In this paper, we conducted a pre-registered, online incentivized lab experiment using a high-
powered sample of Americans to test whether people generally use others’ face mask usage as 
a signal of social identity instead of innate willingness to cooperate during the COVID-19 
pandemic. In contrast to previous research that used surveys to demonstrate that mask wearers 
have strong preferences for caring for others and equality for all (9), we found little evidence 
that mask wearers behaved more cooperatively than non-mask wearers in the PD game 
compared to non-mask wearers when information about their own and the other person’s mask 
usage is not salient. However, more consistent with social identity theory, we found strong 
evidence of in-group versus out-group bias based on mask usage during the pandemic. Non-
mask wearers were 23 percentage points (p=0.001) less likely to cooperate than mask wearers 
when facing a mask-wearing partner, and 26 percentage points (p<0.001) more likely to 
cooperate than mask wearers when facing a non-mask wearing partner. These findings are 
surprising, considering that there is little evidence that mask wearers were generally more 
cooperative than non-mask wearers in the scenario where the information about mask usage 
was not known to the participants.  
 
Our results are notably different from recent studies that found zero social identity effects 
associated with COVID-19 vaccination. Kohn et al. (34) demonstrated that vaccinators and 
non-vaccinators generally treat vaccinators better in prosocial activities and, in a follow-up 
study by Weisel (35), that there is little evidence of the politicization of vaccination in people’s 
prosocial behaviours even when, like face masks, there are more Democrats than Republicans 
who are pro-vaccine. One possible explanation for this is that, unlike face masks, vaccination 
and vaccination intentions are not readily visible to both in-group and out-group members. 
Hence, despite evidence of political partisanship based on vaccination against COVID-19 
shown in Weisel (35), without visibility of one’s vaccination status to others, it would be less 
likely that vaccination is going to be affected by politicization when compared to wearing face 
masks in America (10-14).   
 
Moreover, not only have we demonstrated that face masks signal strong social identity, we 
have also uncovered evidence of an in-group bias based on face masks that is completely 
orthogonal to one’s political identity and remains unexplained in our regression model. Despite 
the politicization of face masks being the likely root cause of the social identity effects, our 
experimental evidence seems to suggest that people may have evolved over time to assign face 
mask usage as a minimal condition required for favouring in-group members and 
discriminating against out-group members. 
 
Our results, which provide new insights into the extent and the mechanisms behind the deep 
divide over face masks in America, have important public health implications. With the more 
infectious strains, e.g., the UK (B.1.1.7) and South African (B.1.351) variants, taking over and 
vaccination programs still rolling in America, public messages designed to curb the 
transmission rate by increasing awareness about face mask effectiveness in protecting 
themselves and others in the community from COVID-19 (36) are unlikely to change non-
mask wearers’ world views and behaviours towards mask usage as doing so would signal 
disloyalty to their held political identity. A better public health strategy might focus less on the 
details of the messages and more on the ‘messenger’ or the information source. Studies in 
behavioural economics have shown how messengers who are authority figures, share similar 
characteristics with and are likable to the target individuals, tend to be more successful in 
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getting their messages across and, in turn, change individuals’ choices and behaviours (37, 38). 
Given that part of the social-identity effects is explained by political identity, non-mask wearers 
might be more willing to listen to a message about face mask’s effectiveness from an 
authoritative figure in the Republican party or non-political figures who share similar 
characteristics or are generally well-liked by non-mask wearers. This could include, for 
example, family doctors of non-mask wearers and mask-wearing friends who share the same 
political affiliation as non-mask wearers. Future research could explore what type of messenger 
works best at reducing the social identity effects of face masks and, in-so-doing increase the 
mask usage rate in the United States and elsewhere around the world. 
 
Finally, our findings, when viewed in conjunction with Korn et al. (34) and Wiesel (35), 
suggest that political partisanship based on health measures are more likely to lead to actual 
polarization in the take-up rate when the health measures in question are visible and salient to 
the individual and others in the community. Given the recent political discussions on vaccine 
passports (39, 40) and getting those who have been vaccinated against COVID-19 to wear a 
sticker visible to others (41), our results suggest that such efforts might lead to the unintended 
politicization of vaccinations, which would inevitably undermine the large-scale vaccination 
efforts to stop the spread of COVID-19.  
 
Like all studies in social sciences, our study is not without limitations. One concern is the 
external validity of our findings. While it has been shown that people can easily identify PD 
games and play according to the game theory in the lab (42), it is possible that the same 
individuals may behave differently when facing a similar social dilemma in the real-world. It 
also remains to be seen whether our results can be generalised to other types of health measures 
such as vaccine passports and social distancing — scenarios where the stakes are large and 
interactions are repeated across countries and stages of the pandemic. Nonetheless, we have no 
reason to believe that the results depend on other characteristics of the subjects, materials, or 




Anonymized data have been deposited in Open Science Framework (https://osf.io/qmyg5/). 
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Table S1. Summary statistics for key demographic variables. SD in parentheses. 
Table S2. Marginal effects within and across conditions. * 0.10 ** 0.05 *** 0.01. Standard 
errors in parentheses, clustered at individual level. Marginal effects from a Pooled Probit Regression 
using data on cooperation towards mask wearers, non-mask wearers and anonymous partners. For Panel 
A, marginal effects are relative to that of having an anonymous partner. For Panel B, marginal effects 
are relative to that of being a mask wearer. Includes controls for gender, age, ethnicity, the political 
party supported, education, household income, the exchange rate, and the order of the PD games. 
Table S3. Mediators of cooperation. * 0.10 ** 0.05 *** 0.01. Errors clustered at individual 
level. Marginal effects from a Pooled Probit Regression using data on cooperation towards 
mask wearers and non-mask wearers. Includes controls for gender, age, ethnicity, the political 
party supported, education, household income, the exchange rate, and the order of the PD 
games. 
Fig S1. Expectations and Altruism towards Partners by mask usage. 4-standard-error bars 
(2 above, 2 below) to represent 95% confidence intervals.  
Table S4. Opinions on Covid-19 by Political Affiliation. * 0.10 ** 0.05 *** 0.01. OLS 
regressions with controls for own mask usage, gender, age, ethnicity, education, household 
income, the exchange rate, and the order of the PD games. Baseline group is Democrats. See 




Table S5. Opinions on Mask Wearing by Political Affiliation. * 0.10 ** 0.05 *** 0.01. OLS 
regressions with controls for own mask usage, gender, age, ethnicity, education, household 
income, the exchange rate, and the order of the PD games. Baseline group is Democrats. See 
Tables S2 and S3 for more details. 
 
Table S6. Relative Moral Opinions by Political Affiliation. * 0.10 ** 0.05 *** 0.01. OLS 
regressions with controls for own mask usage, gender, age, ethnicity, education, household 
income, the exchange rate, and the order of the PD games. Baseline group is Democrats. See 
Table S4 for more details. 
 
Table S7. Marginal effects of Political Variables. * 0.10 ** 0.05 *** 0.01. Errors clustered 
at individual level. Marginal effects from a Pooled Probit Regression using data on cooperation 
towards mask wearers, non-mask wearers and anonymous partners. Regressions in Panel A 
control for the interaction between political party and mask wearing partner; marginal effects 
are relative to that of being a Democrat. Regressions in Panel B control for the interaction 
between conservativeness and mask wearing partner. Also includes controls for gender, age, 
ethnicity, the political party supported, education, household income, the exchange rate, and 
the order of the PD games. 
 
Table S8. Interaction between Political Affiliation and Partner Type on Mediators of 
Cooperation. * 0.10 ** 0.05 *** 0.01. Errors clustered at individual level. OLS regressions 
using data on expectations and altruism towards mask wearers and non-mask wearers. Includes 
controls for gender, age, ethnicity, education, household income, the session, and the order of 
the PD games. 
 
Table S9. Interaction between Political Conservativeness and Partner Type on Mediators 
of Cooperation. * 0.10 ** 0.05 *** 0.01. Errors clustered at individual level. OLS regressions 
using data on expectations and altruism towards mask wearers and non-mask wearers. Includes 
controls for gender, age, ethnicity, education, household income, the session, and the order of 
the PD games. 
 
Table S10. Marginal Effects within partner mask wearing conditions. * 0.10 ** 0.05 *** 
0.01. Errors clustered at individual level. Marginal effects from a Pooled Probit Regression 
using data on cooperation towards mask wearers, non-mask wearers and anonymous partners. 
Regressions control for the interaction between political party and mask wearing partner, and 
the interaction between own mask usage and mask wearing partner. Marginal effects are 
relative to that of being mask wearer. Also, includes controls for gender, age, ethnicity, the 
political party supported, education, household income, the session, and the order of the PD 
games.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
